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World reserves of natural gas are abundant and expected to increase up to 2050. World gas production is projected to 
more than double between 2000 and 2050. However, regional disparities in gas reserves and production costs are 
expected to modify the regional gas supply pattern in 2050: about half of the total gas production will originate from 
the CIS and the Middle East.  
Important uncertainties remain on the EU27 gas demand and supply in the long term. For example, on one hand, the 
enlargement of the EU modifies the landscape. The question of the penetration of the natural gas in the energy balance 
is for a “new entrant” an important aspect of their energy policy. On the other hand, the liberalisation of the EU gas 
market may have important consequences on the strategies of gas producers like Russia.  
Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years, European demand for gas has grown rapidly for several reasons : price 
competitiveness, environmental advantages over other fossil fuels and abundant resources. The 
rise in gas consumption has been particularly remarkable in the power generation sector. Europe’s 
growing demand for gas shows no sign of abating in the long run. According to POLES model, 
the Reference case projects the continuation of this trend through 2050 – although at a lower pace 
by the end of the projection period. In this framework the main question is how the projected 
growing market for gas, combined with the decline of gas production in Europe, will affect the 
outlook of gas supplies to 2050 and what the impacts will be on the security of supply in the 
European Union. 
The POLES model (Box 1) provides a good description of a balancing gas market for the 
enlarged EU27. It is commonly accepted that projecting global energy trends to 2050 involves 
considerable uncertainties not only in the supply but also in the demand side. In order to take into 
account these uncertainties alternative outlooks will be compared to the Reference scenario. 
Box 1 : POLES model 
The POLES model provides a complete system for the simulation and economic analysis of three 
regional markets (America, Europe/Africa, and Asia) so as to account for regional differences in 
cost and market structures. 
The POLES model is a dynamic Partial Equilibrium Model, essentially designed for the energy 
sector, including also energy markets and GHG emitting activities. The simulation process is 
dynamic, in a year by year recursive approach that allows de-scribing full development pathways 









































7The use of the POLES model combines a high degree of detail on the key components of the 
energy systems and a strong economic consistency, as all changes in these key components are at 
least partly determined by relative price changes at sectoral level. The changes in international 
prices of oil, gas and coal are determined endogenously in the model. The international price 
equations take into account the relevant variables associated to short-term adjustments in price 
levels, such as the Gulf capacity utilisation rate for oil, and to medium and long-term variables 
such as the Reserve on Production ratio for oil and gas, or the trend in productivity and 
production costs for coal. 
The POLES model identifies forty seven world regions or countries, with a full description of the 
energy systems of the European Union and of the largest countries. For each region or country, 
the model articulates four main modules dealing with final energy demand, new and renewable 
energy technologies, electricity and other energy transformation sectors, and primary energy 
supply. Gas supply profiles in the largest world producing countries are dealt with a discovery 
process model. 
The integration of import demand and export capacities of the different regions are ensured in 
the international energy market module, which balances the international energy flows. The 
natural gas trade and production is modelled on the one hand on the basis of the capacities from 
each producer to each sub-regional market and on the other hand on the actual quantities 
supplied by each producer for the demand simulated by the model. 
First the model calculates the total new capacities required by each market. Then, the projected 
capacities along the different routes depend on the gap between the price on the considered 
market and a cost benchmark, associated to each route: the larger this gap, the higher the 
incentive to develop new capacities. A constraint allows limiting the possible “crowding out” 
effect of new entrants on the different market. 
The actual capacities are then derived from projected in the previous five years period, with a 
constraint ensuring that new capacities will not induce a rapid exhaustion of the available 
reserves of the considered producer. 
Finally the model allocates the market shares of the major exporters on each market, on the basis 
of the variable transport costs on each route. 
 
European Natural gas market features 
The EU gas market is rapidly expanding and growth is expected to continue in the next 50 years. 
The growth is much more important up to 2020 (2.1 %/year), stabilise up to 2030 and begin 
slightly do decrease after that date. However EU 27 gas demand in 2050 is 13% higher than in 












































































































The expansion of gas use in the EU27 is determined principally by the rise of gas use for power 
generation. The share of gas in electricity production has more than doubled in the last ten years 
and continues to increase to 38 % in 2010, 45% in 2020 and 43% after that. 
 
Table 1 : Overview of EU27 gas market 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050
Share of gas in gross inlad consumption 16% 23% 25% 29% 29% 27%
Share of gas in electricity production 12% 31% 38% 45% 43% 43%
Share of gas supplies
Europe 54% 57% 46% 46% 35% 14%
CIS 28% 22% 23% 30% 68%
Africa, Middle east 15% 32% 31% 35% 18%
EU27 external dependence to gas 46% 43% 54% 54% 65% 86%  
Another important feature of the EU27 gas market is that the role of the European production 
decrease steadily. Its part in the European consumption is divided by four at the end of the 
simulation period (14%). This means that EU27 external dependence to gas increase from 43% 
today to 65% in 2030 and to 86% in 2050. 
 






Figure 1) : some of them with limited or declining gas reserves are expected to become net 
importers leading to modification of the world gas trade patterns. For instance, the rapid gas 
demand growth in Asia is expected to have some influence on the EU gas supply pattern which 
means higher supply risks for the EU.  The CIS is expected to be the lead gas supplier of the 
EU countries during the whole simulation period, its contribution may vary from 28 % 
today to 68 % in 2050. So it is important to analyze the strategies and the behavior of one 
of the main European gas suppliers, Russia and its major company Gazprom. 
Russian and European gas interdependence: some perspectives in the context of the 









































7Russia is the main supplier of Europe and more particularly the European Union. In 2005 
its exports to this zone (excluding CIS and Baltic countries) amounted to 154 Bcm
 per 
year (Giga or billion cubic metres] of which 126 Bcm for the EU (excluding Baltic 
countries), or nearly 90% of its total gas exports.  
•  Russian dependence on exports to Europe in the short and middle terms 
Given the current state of its infrastructure and the terms of sale for its gas on the various 
markets (Russia, CIS and Europe) between now and 2020, Europe will remain Russia's 
main, perhaps only export market, a situation reflected in the main targets it has set for its 
gas exports. According to the long-term Energy Plan of 2003 (Mintopenergo, 2003), total 
exports will rise from 217 Bcm
 in 2000, of which 60% for Europe, to 245-275 Bcm by 
2010, of which 71% for Europe, then 270-275 Bcm by 2020, of which 74% for Europe.  
Europe is the one that allows Russia to obtain the greatest value from its gas production 
because of low gas prices in its domestic market and the persistence of non-monetary 
relations concerning some consumers
1. Exports account for almost 70% of Gazprom 
revenue, whereas they represented just under 30% of production. Similarly they are a 
vital source of funding for the Russian state budget. Exports are an essential factor in 
Gazprom's profitability and its ability to fund investments in line with its various 
objectives: diversification into oil, international growth, and, of course, development of 
production and transport infrastructure. 
- Diversification of gas markets in the long term 
The Russian government aims to direct a third of exports to the Asian market by 2010, 
but this can only be a long-term strategy given the constraints affecting development of 
new gas fields and installation of the infrastructure required to serve new markets. In any 
realistic scenario, the constraints associated with building the pipelines and developing 
the gas fields associated with the first major contract would push back the first deliveries 
to beyond 2020, always assuming a positive outcome to negotiations before 2010 (Stern, 
2005, p. 
But in the long term, in view of its gas reserves in Eastern Siberia and in the Republic of 
Sakhalin, Russia could become one of the major suppliers in this area. Three major areas 
of reserves can be identified in Eastern Siberia: the Republic of Sakha, the Irkutsk and 
Kranoyarsk Regions, and the Republic of Sakhalin. In these three areas, the proven and 
potential reserves of hydrocarbons are very significant as they have been assessed at 
between 3.7 and 5.3 trilliard m
3 according to source for proven reserves, and at over 50 
trilliard m
3 for ultimate reserves
2. According to Russia’s long-term energy plan, these 
                                                 
1 In 2006, these prices were $32 per 1,000 m
3 for households and $43 per 1,000 m
3 for industrial units, 
compared with an average of $255 per 1,000 m
3 for exports to Western Europe.  
 
2 The International Energy Agency gives proven reserves of 3. trilliard m
3, E. Khartukov proven reserves of 
5.3 trilliard m











































7reserves allow for anticipated production in 2010 of between 25-30 (conservative 
estimate) and 50 Gm
3 (optimistic estimate) and production in 2020, of between 55-90 
(conservative estimate) and 110 Gm
3 (optimistic estimate) in 2010. The final objective 
(in the very long term) would be to create a “North-East Asia Gas Pipeline Network” that 
would link Japan, China and Korea to the productive regions in Sakhalin and Eastern 
Siberia (Toichi, 2003). 
The option that currently has the greatest chance of being realised consists of making 
supplies to China from the Kovytka Deposit in Irkutsk Region. Feasibility studies have 
dealt with figures of 20 Gm
3 per year for exports to China, to which 10 Gm
3 can be added 
for exports to South Korea. The advantages of this solution are many. In particular, the 
development of the deposit and the gas pipeline could be assured with help from foreign 
investors, especially BP. Following the creation of a joint venture with TNK (Tyumen 
Oil Company), BP is now one of the major shareholders in the production company 
Rusia Petroleum, which holds the licence for the development of the Kovytka Deposit. 
The main question still unanswered on this project concerns the place to be occupied by 
Gazprom, which currently holds the monopoly on gas exports. 
The development of LNG exports, as yet absent from Gazprom policy, is the only way of 
really achieving the objective of market diversification in the medium term. However, 
developing sales of LNG means deploying technology that demands considerable 
investment, added to which it is a new departure for Gazprom and time-consuming to 
deploy. It necessitates a partnership with large companies capable of providing the 
technology and capital to develop the field itself and the infrastructure. 
•  Russia faced with the deregulation of the European gas market 
The main market for Russian gas exported, the European Union, is currently undergoing 
fundamental changes to its organisation, structures, rules and institutions. These changes 
are compelling Gazprom to make some changes. Its strategy must be structured around 
two fundamental questions. How can its market share be increased in an environment that 
will become more and more competitive? How can the export pipelines be secured in 
order to reach those markets? The disintegration of the Soviet Union has weakened the 
Russian export route system by increasing the number of transit territories in a politically 
unstable environment. 
- Adapting export and transit infrastructure to suit the European priority 
The importance of the European market justified a major drive to secure export routes. 
Russia quickly doubled up the transit routes to Europe with the Yamal 1 gas pipeline 
which crosses Belarus and Poland. Gazprom is still increasing transport capacity 
(currently about 145 Gm³ per year) by diversifying export channels. This process has 
been consolidated with the commissioning of the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black 
Sea to Turkey. Plans for an extension into southern Europe, Greece and Italy are taking 









































7Nordstream (former North European Gas Pipeline) under the Baltic to Germany
3. It 
follows an agreement signed in 2005 between Gazprom, BASF and E.ON and will be the 
first direct channel to Europe, doing without the need to pass through other countries. 
- A strategy of downstream diversification 
To maintain its outlets in national markets now open to competition and take a larger 
share of gas revenue, Gazprom has consolidated the strategy of downstream 
diversification, which it has been developing since the 1990s (Locatelli and Quast, 1997). 
This strategy is based on setting up marketing subsidiaries, purchasing shares in local 
companies and forming joint ventures with national partners in transport, distribution and 
trading. In the middle of the 1990s Gazprom started Wingas in Germany, a joint venture 
with BASF-Wintershall, to transport gas and sell it directly. This enabled it to take a 13% 
share of the wholesale market. 
Since then Gazprom has moved into the new EU member states – former Soviet republics 
(Baltic countries) or ex-Comecon (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics) – 
taking advantage of privatisation of the gas industry. Its objective is clearly to maintain 
its outlets in countries that are heavily dependent on its gas. It is now using the same 
strategy to attack the large European markets, attempting to gain control of major 
national or regional distributors, as demonstrated by its interest in Centrica or Scottish 
Power in the United Kingdom in 2006. It may be interested in taking a share in Distrigaz, 
of Belgium, and strengthening its position in Germany, by buying out local distributors. It 
is building alliances by swapping assets in sales or distribution, on the one hand, and 
production, on the other. For instance, the agreement signed in 2006 between BASF and 
Gazprom will give the former a 25% share in the large Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field in 
exchange for consolidation of the latter's position in Wingas (share rising from 35% to 
50%) and in a marketing company, WIEH. Gazprom is pursuing similar ends through its 
framework agreement with E.ON-Ruhrgas of July 2006 and the agreement with ENI 
which provides for direct sales of 3 Bcm per year by 2010, and scope for Gazprom 
eventually to take a 10% share in ENIpower. 
- Maintaining a system of long-term contracts 
At present, Gazprom is trying to maintain a system of long-term contracts while looking 
to take benefit from the new market characteristics brought about by deregulation 
(Komarov, 2004). Its managers have on numerous occasions stressed their preference for 
long-term contracts while agreeing to the modification of certain clauses in existing 
contracts and “playing the spot market card” at the right time. The spot sales made by the 
gas company on the British market in 2003 (almost 3 Gm
3) are indicative of a policy that 
could develop (especially on the Belgian market). Direct sales are only a secondary 
                                                 
3 The cost of this route, almost twice that of land-based options (Yamal 2, refurbishing and enlarging the 
gas pipeline through Ukraine) is the price to pay for independence. To build the pipeline Gazprom, BASF 
and E.ON set up a joint venture, 51% of which is owned by Gazprom. Gasunie will also be taking a share. 
The first 27 Bcm a year slice should open in 2010. The pipeline should carry a third of Russian exports to 










































7element in the Gazprom’s strategy. Such transaction are motivated more by a desire to 
seize the opportunity of selling when prices are more favourable, for example when spot 
prices are higher than contract prices. They cannot be used as the main basis of a strategy. 
If Gazprom’s short-term sales are too high, they could upset the current balance between 
marginal spot markets and long-term contracts by encouraging the consolidation of 
European spot trading and the credibilisation of hubs as reference markets (Finon, 
Locatelli, 2007). 
- Limiting “gas to gas” competition in Russia 
Against a background of increasing instability for traditional suppliers in the EU, it is 
understandable that the Russian government wants to prevent competition developing 
between “Russian gas and Russian gas”; this is justification for preserving the gas export 
monopoly currently held by Gazprom. The Russian oil companies that hold significant 
gas reserves, such as Lukoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz, have on several occasions 
shown a willingness to export gas to Europe. They would therefore be likely to invest on 
a spot basis, as well as on a contractual basis, for significant quantities of gas on the 
European market (Locatelli, 2004). This possibility, however, depends to a considerable 
extent on an overall reform in the Russian gas industry, and this is not currently on the 
agenda. It assumes on one hand that the Gazprom’s export monopoly will be remove and 
that free and equal access to its gas pipeline network will be allowed. These two 
conditions are not currently being fulfilled (Ahrend, Tompson, 2004). 
Conclusion 
Consumer countries have questioned Russia and Gazprom about future growth in gas 
production and its ability, beyond 2010, to fulfil its export commitments at the level 
announced in the long-term Energy Plan of 2003. Its reserves are not in doubt, but 
Gazprom seems to be dragging its feet before developing new gas fields, in particularly 
the Yamal field, whereas the three large reserves of Medevhze, Urengoy and Yamburg, 
which entered production under the Soviet Union are reaching their peak and will soon 
start to decline. At present Gazprom is only allocating 30% of its investments to 
developing production. But a significant increase in domestic prices could substantially 
slow growth in demand and provide additional capacity for exports without a massive 
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